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Five experiments examine the proposal that object names are closely linked to
representations of global, 3D shape by comparing memory for simple line draw-
ings of structurally possible and impossible novel objects. Objects were rendered
impossible through local edge violations to global coherence (cf. Schacter,
Cooper, & Delaney, 1990) and supplementary observations confirmed that the
sets of possible and impossible objects were matched for their distinctiveness.
Employing a test of explicit recognition memory, Experiment 1 confirmed that
the possible and impossible objects were equally memorable. Experiments 2–4
demonstrated that adults learn names (single-syllable non-words presented as
count nouns, e.g., “This is a dax”) for possible objects more easily than for impos-
sible objects, and an item-based analysis showed that this effect was unrelated to
either the memorability or the distinctiveness of the individual objects. Experi-
ment 3 indicated that the effects of object possibility on name learning were long
term (spanning at least 2 months), implying that the cognitive processes being re-
vealed can support the learning of object names in everyday life. Experiment 5
demonstrated that hearing someone else name an object at presentation improves
recognition memory for possible objects, but not for impossible objects. Taken
together, the results indicate that object names are closely linked to the descrip-
tions of global, 3D shape that can be derived for structurally possible objects but
not for structurally impossible objects. In addition, the results challenge the view
that object decision and explicit recognition necessarily draw on separate mem-
ory systems, with only the former being supported by these descriptions of global
object shape. It seems that recognition also can be supported by these descrip-
tions, provided the original encoding conditions encourage their derivation.
Hearing an object named at encoding appears to be just such a condition. These
observations are discussed in relation to the effects of naming in other visual
tasks, and to the role of visual attention in object identification.
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INTRODUCTION
Given that different types of visual representation have been distinguished, the
question arises as to whether these are differentially associated with verbal
information. For example, does one type of visual object representation have
privileged links with object names?
Basic-level object representations
The concept of a basic-level visual representation emphasizes the significance
of an intermediate level of structural description in object categorization
(Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Rosch et al. argue that
this level of representation strikes an effective balance between maximizing the
structural similarity of objects in the same category and minimizing the similar-
ity of objects in different categories. Object shape is emphasized, rather than
material and surface qualities, partly because the visual perceptual system is
efficient at encoding this, but also because shape is a relatively reliable cue to
object kind and object function (see, for example, Landau, Smith, & Jones,
1998). Regarding visual–verbal connections, Rosch et al. provide evidence for
the special status of the link between basic-level representations of shape and
object labels. They propose that these representations are associated with the
most frequently used object names, which also happen to be the simplest object
labels, the first to be acquired during development, and the most likely labels to
be incorporated in languages with a limited object vocabulary (such, as Ameri-
can Sign Language—ASL).
Object naming and categorization
There is other evidence that object names, and count nouns in particular, are
linked with visual representations of object shape that can accommodate varia-
tion in the appearance of an individual object and in the appearance of different
objects from the same category (see Landau, 1994; Landau, Smith, & Jones,
1998, for reviews). When children and adults learn to associate a count noun
with a novel object (e.g., “This is a dax”), they choose to generalize the name to
other objects (e.g., “Which of these is a dax also?”) on the basis of object shape
rather than on the basis of material or surface qualities. The salience of shape in
the extension of these object labels does not reflect an indiscriminate bias to
group objects on the basis of shape, even for children, but is specific to situa-
tions in which count nouns are linked with objects (i.e., when objects are
named). Thus, when objects are grouped in the absence of any object labels
(e.g., “What goes with this?”), the shape bias is less apparent. Indeed, when
objects are distinctively textured and the conditions of illumination highlight
this, then labelling the objects with an adjective (e.g., “This is a daxy one”) or a
superordinate label (e.g., “This is a kind of dax”), can create a situation where
598 WALKER, DIXON, SMITH
generalization of a verbal label is based on material similarity rather than shape
similarity (see Landau, 1994, for a review of the empirical evidence).
In these studies of object naming, object shape is considered to be more
abstract than a 2D or 3D description that is specific to the conditions under
which an object is viewed (i.e., shape is described in a way that is viewpoint
independent). Furthermore, the concept of shape can accommodate the recon-
figuration of non-rigid objects, as when a cat changes from a standing to a sit-
ting position, or the lid of a box is opened. Thus, generalization of the name
assigned to a novel object is not precluded by such reconfigurations of shape
(see Landau, 1994).
Biederman (1987) argues that visual object recognition is based on a rela-
tively abstract and largely viewpoint-independent description of an objects 3D
shape. (The material and surface properties of objects are considered to contrib-
ute to object recognition only secondarily.) These structural descriptions are
thought to capture all the primitive volumetric forms (geons) making up an
objects overall shape, along with their spatial arrangement framed in object-
based coordinates. In his experimental work, Biederman makes extensive use
of a naming task on the understanding that object naming provides a relatively
pure index of the contribution that these structural descriptions make to object
recognition (see, for example, Biederman & Cooper, 1992). He and his col-
leagues find that priming effects in object naming generalize across variations
in an objects appearance that result from changes in viewpoint (e.g., changes in
picture size, spatial location, and angle of view) (see Biederman & Cooper,
1992; Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993; Cooper, Biederman, & Hummel,
1992a).
Structural possibility and priming in object decision
A presemantic description of the global, 3D shape of an object has been isolated
by contrasting peoples responses to pictures of possible and impossible novel
objects (see Cooper, 1994; Cooper & Schacter, 1992, for reviews). Again, these
structural descriptions are thought of as mental representations of an objects
component parts and their object-based spatial arrangement, which together
specify the objects global, 3D shape (e.g., Schacter et al., 1990). Depicted
objects are rendered impossible by arranging for a picture to contain local sur-
face and edge violations to complete coherence (see Figure 1 for examples of
possible and impossible objects). In this way, qualitatively different effects
from the two types of picture are attributed to the impact of a global, 3D shape
representation, since it is the availability of this that distinguishes possible from
impossible objects.1
It has been observed that priming in an object decision task (deciding
whether a novel object is structurally possible or impossible) is confined to pos-
sible objects. This implies that priming reflects the impact of a description of
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Figure 1. Examples of line drawings of possible and impossible objects used in the experiments.
the global, 3D shape of the priming object.2 Converging evidence for this
comes from the observation that such priming is contingent on the picture
primes being encoded in a way that emphasizes the depicted objects global
shape (Schacter & Cooper, 1993; Schacter et al., 1990). That the structural
description is viewpoint independent is indicated by the observation that prim-
ing is equally strong whether study and test pictures depict an object from the
same or from different viewpoints (Cooper et al., 1992b). Given its focus on
structural information, coupled with its viewpoint invariance, the representa-
tion supporting object decision priming has been considered by Cooper,
Schacter, Ballesteros, and Moore (1992b) to be the same representation sup-
porting priming in Biederman’s object naming task.
Recognition memory
The involvement of structural descriptions in object decision priming is con-
trasted with the involvement of quite different visual representations in explicit
recognition memory (Cooper & Schacter, 1992). This contrast is evident in the
stochastic independence of object decision and recognition for studied possible
objects (Schacter et al., 1990; Schacter, Cooper, Delaney, Peterson, & Tharan,
1991a). In addition, a number of manipulations have been observed to influ-
ence explicit recognition, equally for possible and impossible objects, while at
the same time having no impact on object decision. These manipulations
include repeating the presentation of picture primes (Schacter et al., 1991a),
adding functional and associative decisions to the encoding of picture primes
(Schacter & Cooper, 1993; Schacter et al., 1991a), and introducing study-to-
test differences in picture size (Cooper et al., 1992b). Interestingly, Biederman
and Cooper (1992) also found that study-to-test changes in size affected
explicit recognition memory without impacting at all on object naming.
This evidence suggests that object naming and object decision both rely on
the same representation of object shape, whereas explicit recognition is
supported by other representations. However, the nature of these other repre-
sentations remains largely unspecified. Given the general equivalence of
recognition for possible and impossible objects, in terms of absolute levels of
performance and sensitivity to a range of manipulations, these other representa-
tions would appear to be less global than the shape descriptions underlying
object naming and object decision. Rather, they appear to preserve information
about the more localized visual features incorporated in depictions of possible
and impossible objects. In addition, of course, they have been shown to pre-
serve information about size and parity, and are assumed to incorporate visual
details indicative of an objects material and surface qualities (such as colour
and texture).
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The present study
These different lines of enquiry suggest that a view-independent visual repre-
sentation of the global, 3D shape of an object is closely linked with representa-
tion of its category name. Although comparing memory for pictures of possible
and impossible objects has served to isolate this form of visual representation in
the object decision task, the same comparison has not been made in relation to
object naming. The present study is a first attempt to manipulate object possi-
bility to examine the link between visual representation of global, 3D shape and
representation of object name. The main task devised for this purpose (Experi-
ments 2–4) requires adults to learn nonsense names, in the form of count nouns,
to pictures of possible and impossible novel objects. It is predicted that object
names will be learned more easily to pictures of possible objects than to pic-
tures of impossible objects. It is assumed that there will be some learning of
names for impossible objects, because there are other bases on which picture–
name associations can be learned, as when people learn names for visual fea-
tures such as colour. However, the argument is that object names will be
learned more easily to pictures of possible objects because support can be
derived from the normally close links between representations of global, 3D
object shape and object names.
The present study also examines the impact on recognition memory of hear-
ing an object named at encoding (Experiment 5). More specifically, it tests the
proposal that global structural possibility can influence recognition memory
and will do so when objects are named at encoding. Previous research has
shown that priming, and therefore an effect of object possibility, is not always
observed in the object decision task (Schacter et al., 1990). Thus, priming has
been observed when participants have had to indicate whether each priming
object faced left or right, but not when they have had to say if it contained more
vertical or horizontal edges. It would appear that deriving a structural descrip-
tion of an objects overall shape is not obligatory and is partly determined by the
encoding instructions. It is possible, therefore, that in previous studies of recog-
nition memory object possibility has generally failed to have an effect, not
because structural descriptions are incapable of supporting recognition mem-
ory, but because the encoding tasks have not made 3D object shape a salient
feature. To test the idea that representations of global, 3D shape and name are
closely linked, it is determined if hearing the experimenter name an object at
encoding with a count noun will ensure that object possibility has an impact on
recognition memory.
EXPERIMENT 1
Before determining if verbal labels are more easily learned to pictures of possi-
ble objects than to pictures of impossible objects, it was considered important
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to ensure that there was no effect of object possibility on recognition memory
for the pictures themselves. The absence of such an effect would offer reassur-
ance that the two types of picture were matched in terms of their own memora-
bility. Any effect of object possibility on the ease with which object names are
learned could then be related specifically to the shape–name associations.
In an incidental memory condition, recognition memory for the pictures was
examined when participants had no expectation that their memory for the pic-
tures would be tested. It was considered that this would minimize the likelihood
that verbal recoding and elaboration would be used to facilitate remembering,
on the assumption that these are intentional processes (see, Baddeley, 1990, for
evidence, reviewed in the context of the working memory framework, that ver-
bal recoding of to-be-remembered visual items is intentional). In this way, inci-
dental recognition memory was used as a relatively pure measure of the visual
memorability of the pictures. It was expected that object possibility would have
no effect, confirming the equivalence of the two sets of pictures. In an inten-
tional memory condition, recognition memory for the pictures was examined
when participants were forewarned that their memory would be assessed. No
attempt was made to encourage participants to adopt any specific strategies for
remembering, verbal or otherwise. The inclusion of this condition permitted
comparison with previous studies in which object possibility failed to influence
intentional recognition memory (e.g., Cooper et al., 1992b, Exp. 1; Schacter et
al., 1991a).
Method
Participants. Eighty undergraduate students at Lancaster University par-
ticipated in the experiment. Forty students were randomly assigned to the inci-
dental and intentional memory conditions, with the constraint that the same
number of male (and female) participants took part in each condition.
Materials. Twenty-four black-on-white line drawings were created using
Macromedia Freehand (version 5.0) on a Power Macintosh 8500/120. They
were printed on a LaserWriter Pro printer and laminated to form 12.5 × 9.5cm
cards. The objects were scaled in the picture so that their maximum dimension,
horizontal or vertical, was approximately 6cm, with individual variation per-
mitted to give the impression the objects were the same size. The twelve possi-
ble objects and four of the impossible objects were based on those illustrated by
Lynn Cooper and Daniel Schacter in their various publications. New pictures of
impossible objects were created by one of the authors (PW). Eight of the pic-
tures are illustrated in Figure 1. A duplicate set of 24 cards was produced for
testing recognition memory. Different sets of cards were prepared for the study
and test phases of the task in order to prevent participants from capitalizing on
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any distinguishing features in the picture cards themselves (such as a blemish in
the lamination or a bent corner).
Design. A mixed design was employed, with Memory Condition (inciden-
tal versus intentional) as a between-participants factor, and Object Possibility
(possible versus impossible objects) as a within-participants factor.
Preliminary work revealed that setting the number of to-be-remembered
pictures at 10 yielded intermediate levels of task performance that avoided
floor and ceiling. For each trial, therefore, 10 possible and 10 impossible
objects were randomly selected from the pool of 24 pictures. From this set of 20
pictures, five possible and five impossible objects were selected at random. A
random order for their presentation was determined, with the constraint that no
more than two successive presentations involved the same type of object. Each
ordering for a set of to-be-remembered pictures, as well as the reverse ordering,
was used once in each memory condition.
Procedure. All participants were told that the researchers were interested
in arithmetic, and specifically in the way that people speeded up across succes-
sive practice periods. It was explained that they would be required to complete
as many addition problems as possible in two, 2-minute spells. These were to be
separated by a period in which they would be engaged in unrelated activity.
After the first period of arithmetic all participants completed the visual
memory task. Those in the incidental condition were told that the experimenter
wanted them to look at some unrelated material in order to prevent them from
thinking about, and visualizing, any of the arithmetic problems they had just
completed. They were instructed simply to look at the sequence of pictures, and
it was explained that after doing so they would undertake a second period of
paced arithmetic. Participants in the intentional condition were told that the
experimenter was also interested in testing their visual memory, and for this
reason they were being asked to look at a sequence of 10 pictures. They were
given a brief indication of the manner in which their memory would be tested.
The experimenter placed the 10 to-be-remembered pictures on a table in
front of the participant. A computer metronome synchronized the placement of
successive cards, on top of each other, at a 2sec rate. After presentation of the
sequence of to-be-remembered pictures, all 20 pictures selected for that trial
were displayed on the table. The sets of possible and impossible objects were
arranged separately, each in two columns of five pictures. Participants were
required to select the five possible and five impossible objects they had just
seen. They alternated their selections across the two object types, with half the
participants in each condition choosing a possible object first, and half choos-
ing an impossible object first. A second spell at arithmetic did not take place
and participants completed just one trial.
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After completion of the experiment, participants in the incidental memory
condition were asked if they had anticipated that their memory for the pictures
would be tested. The plan was to replace any participant who did anticipate
being tested, but in the event this was not necessary.
Results
Table 1 presents the mean number of possible and impossible objects correctly
recognized in the incidental and intentional memory conditions. A 2 (Object
Possibility) × 2 (Memory Condition) analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a
significant effect of memory condition, F(1, 78) = 5.65, p = .02, with more pic-
tures correctly recognized in the intentional memory condition. Object possi-
bility failed to have a significant effect on recognition, F(1, 78) = 0.28, p = .60,
and did not interact significantly with memory condition, F(1, 78) < 1.
An item-based analysis was undertaken on the number of participants cor-
rectly recognizing each of the 24 pictures. Memory condition failed to have a
significant effect, F(1, 44) = 2.24, p = .14. The main effect of object possibility
and its interaction with memory condition were also insignificant, F(1, 44) =
.001, p = .98, and F(1, 44) < 1, respectively. That the memorability of the indi-
vidual pictures had been measured with some reliability was indicated by a sig-
nificant correlation in item memorability across the incidental and intentional
memory conditions, r = .41, p < .05.
Because of the importance of the null result regarding object possibility, it
was determined if Experiment 1 was powerful enough to provide sufficient
protection against a Type II error (see Keppel, Saufley, & Tokunaga, 1992, for
an explanation of the procedures for relating indices of power, effect size, and
sample size). If it is assumed that there is an underlying effectof object possibil-
ity of moderate size ( w 2 = .06), then 54 participants would be required to yield
an acceptable value of .80 for power. In Experiment 5, reported later, explicit
recognition memory for the same set of pictures was assessed in the same way
as in Experiment 1. In one condition, where the pictured objects were named by
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TABLE 1
Experiment 1: Mean number of possible
and impossible objects correctly
recognized by a participant as a function of




Memory Condition Possible Impossible
Incidental 3.58 3.70
Intentional 3.98 3.98
Maximum score = 5, chance = 2.5.
the experimenter at encoding, a significant effect of object possibility was
observed. Based on the value of F associated with this significant result, the
effect of object possibility is seen to be very large, w 2 = .25, and if this value is
applied to Experiment 1, it emerges that 12 participants would be required to
yield a value for power of .08. In summary, from these considerations of effect
size and power, it seems that with 80 participants in Experiment 1 there was
power to provide sufficient protection against a Type II error. This issue is
revisited in the context of Experiment 5, where additional results are combined
with those from Experiment 1 to provide an even more powerful test of the null
effect of object possibility.
Supplementary observations
A new group of 15 participants, drawn from the general student population
at Lancaster University, provided information on the distinctiveness of the 24
objects in order to determine if this feature was confounded with object possi-
bility. They were each given a 132-page booklet containing all possible pair-
ings of objects from the same category (possible and impossible). The black-
on-white line drawings were reproduced exactly as for Experiment 1, and the
pairs of pictures appeared in a random order, except for the constraint that no
more than two successive pages involved pictures from the same category. Two
alternative booklets were prepared, differing with regard to the order in which
the picture pairs appeared. To each picture pair participants assigned a rating
from –4 (dissimilar) to 4 (similar), on a 9-point scale, indicating the degree to
which they judged the two objects to be visually dissimilar/similar to each
other. Participants were asked to flip through the booklet to appreciate the
nature and variability of the picture pairs. They were then asked to make their
judgements of dissimilarity/similarity relative to the total set of 132 picture
pairs.
Ratings of the picture pairs. Across all participants, an average rating for
each of the 132 picture pairs was determined. The overall means for pairs of
possible and impossible objects were – 0.63 and – 0.55, respectively, a differ-
ence that proved to be insignificant by ANOVA, F(1, 130) < 1.
Ratings of individual objects. For each of the 24 objects, an average rating
was derived from each participants ratings of all the picture pairs in which it
was involved. These average ratings were submitted to an ANOVA with
objects as a within-participants factor. The main effect of object was signifi-
cant, F(23, 322) = 4.11, p < .001, indicating that the rating procedure had mea-
sured the distinctiveness of the objects with some reliability. A planned
comparison confirmed that the difference in the average rating of possible and
impossible objects was not significant, F(1, 14) = 0.06, p = .81. When the
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ratings of distinctiveness for the 24 objects were correlated with the memora-
bility scores obtained in Experiment 1, the relationship proved to be insignifi-
cant, r = .26, p > .10.
Discussion
Telling participants in advance that their memory would be tested enhanced
recognition memory for the pictures, equally so for possible and impossible
objects. This enhancement could reflect the impact of some global aspect of
processing, such as an increase in the overall level of resources allocated to the
task. Alternatively, it could reflect a qualitative shift towards relying on partic-
ular processes and representations. For example, knowing that their memory
was to be tested, participants could have related the pictures to familiar objects
they resembled. It has already been noted that adding functional and associative
decisions to the encoding of picture primes enhances recognition memory, and
does so equally for possible and impossible objects (Schacter & Cooper, 1993;
Schacter et al., 1991a). Whatever qualitative shift in processing might underpin
the enhanced levels of recognition, however, it is clear from the results of
Experiment 1 that it does not involve a greater reliance on representations of
global 3D shape, since such a shift would favour pictures of possible objects
over pictures of impossible objects.
Previous studies have occasionally failed to find an effect of object possibil-
ity on intentional recognition memory, even when there has been an effect on
object decision (e.g., Cooper et al., 1992b, Exp. 1; Schacter et al., 1991a).
Experiment 1 has shown that this insensitivity to object possibility can extend
to incidental as well as intentional remembering. In the light of the power of this
experiment to detect an effect of object possibility, these null results offer reas-
surance that the present sets of pictures are matched with regard to their individ-
ual memorability (see also the results of Experiment 5 later, where incidental
recognition memory for these pictures again failed to show an effect of object
possibility). In addition, the supplementary observations indicate that the two
sets of pictures were also matched regarding their visual distinctiveness. If it is
now found that object possibility influences the ease with which names for
novel objects are learned, then this can be attributed with greater confidence to
the task of associating object shape with object name.
EXPERIMENT 2
The issue of whether object names are more easily learned to pictures of possi-
ble objects than to pictures of impossible objects was addressed directly in
Experiment 2. The presentation of each picture was accompanied by a spoken
nonsense syllable in the context of a sentence frame that assigned it the role of a
count noun (e.g., “This is a dax.”). Participants were requested to learn the non-
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word associated with each picture, so that when subsequently presented with a
picture they could recall the corresponding non-word.
Participants. Forty undergraduate students at Lancaster University partic-
ipated in the experiment. None had participated in Experiment 1.
Materials. The 24 pictures utilized in Experiment 1 (12 possible and 12
impossible objects) were also used in Experiment 2. In addition, 24 single-
syllable non-words were generated to serve as verbal labels for the pictures (cf.
Table 2).
Design. A within-participants design was employed, with object type and
trial number as the two factors. Each participant was exposed to two types of
object (possible and impossible) on each of four successive learning trials.
Memory for each picture–non-word association was assessed on every trial.
Procedure. A random order of presentation for the 24 pictures was deter-
mined for each participant, with the constraint that no more than two successive
presentations involved an object from the same category. This order was used
in the learning phase on all four trials. In this phase the experimenter presented
each picture for 5sec and at the same time gave a spoken verbal label to be asso-
ciated with it. Every verbal label incorporated a different one of the non-words,
presented in a standard sentence frame that assigned to it the function of a count
noun (e.g., “This is a dax.”, “This is a rif.”). The 24 non-words were randomly
assigned to the pictures, differently for each participant, and the pairings were
fixed across all four trials. After presentation of the picture–label pairs, the pic-
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TABLE 2
The single syllable non-
words to be associated with














tures were randomly re-ordered for the test of memory. The experimenter re-
presented each picture in turn and asked for the associated non-word. Partici-
pants were permitted to offer no response if they could not recall the non-word,
but when a response was offered no feedback was provided regarding its cor-
rectness. There was no pressure on participants to respond within a certain time.
The next trial started with another learning phase in which the pictures were
again presented with their verbal labels. A further test phase followed in which
the pictures were presented in a fresh random order. Each participant com-
pleted a total of four trials.
Results
Table 3 presents the mean number of names correctly recalled by a participant
as a function of object type and trial number.
Performance improved across successive trials, as one would expect. In
addition, from trial 1 through to trial 4, the names of possible objects were
recalled better than the names of impossible objects. A 4 (Trial Number) × 2
(Object Possibility) ANOVA confirmed the significance of trial number, F(3,
117) = 157, p < 001, and object possibility, F(1, 39) = 27.0, p < 001. The interac-
tion between these two factors was not significant, F(3, 117) = 2.34, p = .07.
Tests of simple effects showed that object possibility had a significant effect on
every trial, F(1, 39) = 9.96, 18.25, 14.45, and 12.52, for trials 1 to 4, respec-
tively, p < 005 in all cases.
An item-based analysis was undertaken on the average number of trials
(max. = 4) on which the name of each picture was correctly recalled by a partici-
pant. The overall means were 1.5 and 1.13 for possible and impossible objects,
respectively. The effectof object possibility was significant, F(1, 22) = 4.78, p<
.04. This effect remained when the memorability and distinctiveness of the 24
items (see Experiment 1) were treated as covariates, F(1, 21) = 4.78 and 4.62,
respectively, p = .04 in both cases. A second item-based analysis was under-
taken on the number of participants correctly recalling the name of each picture
on each of the four trials. The average number of participants recalling the
name of a possible object on an individual trial was 15.17. The average number
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TABLE 3
Experiment 2: Mean number of names recalled by a
participant as a function of object type and trial
number (max. score = 12)
Trial Number
———————————————
Object Type 1 2 3 4
Possible 1.10 3.47 5.97 7.60
Impossible 0.52 2.00 4.67 6.37
of participants recalling the name of an impossible object on an individual trial
was 11.29. An ANOVA, with possibility as a between-items factor and trial as a
within-items factor, confirmed the significance of both the effect of object pos-
sibility, F(1, 22) = 5.18, p < .04, and the effect of trial, F(3, 66) = 296, p< .001.
Although the overall interaction between object possibility and trial was not
significant, F(3, 66) = 1.71, p = .17, analysis of simple effects revealed that
object possibility had an effect on all trials except the first, F(1, 36) = 0.89, 6.46,
5.22, 5.02, with p = .35, .01, .03, .03, for trials 1 to 4, respectively. Once again,
the main effect of object possibility remained when item memorability and dis-
tinctiveness were treated as covariates, F(1, 21) = 5.14 and 5.13, respectively, p
< .04 in each case.
Discussion
Names can be learned more easily to pictures of possible objects than to pic-
tures of impossible objects, consistent with the idea that names are closely
linked with descriptions of the overall, 3D shapes of objects. Since the results of
Experiment 1 confirmed that the two types of picture were themselves equally
memorable and equally distinctive, and since the non-words were randomly
assigned to the pictures, the different levels of name learning across the two
types of picture appear to reflect aspects of the association between object
shape and object name.
EXPERIMENT 3
Participants in Experiment 2 found themselves in a rather artificial situation,
being asked to learn associations between visual and verbal items that had little
relevance to the real world and which they assumed would not be encountered
again. It is possible, therefore, that the learning observed across the four trials
of Experiment 2 reflects the involvement of special purpose mechanisms, spe-
cifically and temporarily established for the experimental task. The learning
might not reflect processes normally supporting the long-term learning of
object names, and the observed impact of object possibility might have no bear-
ing on the organization of long-term knowledge about objects and their names.
Two months after Experiment 2 was run, the opportunity arose to re-test 16
of the original participants, to determine if there was still some retention of the
shape–name associations and, if so, if the effect of object possibility was still
apparent. The participants had no expectation that they might be approached to
take part in a further study and had not, therefore, taken any steps to rehearse the
shape–name associations encountered in Experiment 2.
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Method
Participants . Sixteen of the original participants were recruited two
months after taking part in Experiment 2. Their availability was not under the
control of the researchers, but was determined by a mix of circumstances unre-
lated to the purpose of the study.
Materials. The materials prepared for Experiment 2 were used again, and
for each participant the original shape–name associations were retained.
Design and procedure . Essentially the same design and procedure were
adopted as for Experiment 2. The one modification involved dispensing with
the study phase on the first of the four trials completed by each participant.
Thus, the experiment started with a testing phase to assess the extent to which
participants could still recall the name associated with each picture. Thereafter,
the remaining three trials were completed in the same way as for Experiment 2.
In the study phase the experimenter presented each picture along with its asso-
ciated non-word. In the testing phase each picture was presented in turn, in a
fresh random order, and participants were requested to recall the associated
non-word. As before, no feedback was provided regarding the correctness of a
response.
Results
Table 4 presents the mean number of non-words correctly recalled as a function
of object possibility and trial number. The results from Experiment 2 for the
same 16 participants are also presented.
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TABLE 4
Mean number of names recalled by a participant as
a function of experiment, object type, and trial
number for participants taking part in both
experiments (max. score = 12)
Trial Number
———————————————
Object Type 1 2 3 4
Experiment 2
Possible 1.00 2.56 4.94 6.75
Impossible 0.37 1.31 3.50 5.31
Experiment 3
Possible 1.94 5.56 7.44 8.56
Impossible 1.12 4.44 6.19 8.19
Performance is consistently superior in Experiment 3, indicating that over
the 2-month period between the experiments some information about the origi-
nal shape–name associations had been retained. Not only does there appear to
be savings in relearning the shape–name associations across trials 2 to 4, but
performance on trial 1 of Experiment 3 is better than performance on trial 1 of
Experiment 2. Performance also improves across successive trials and the
names of possible objects are recalled better than the names of impossible
objects on every trial in each experiment.
A 2 (Experiment) × 4 (Trial Number) × 2 (Object Possibility) ANOVA
revealed significant main effects of experiment, F(1, 15) = 25.91, p = .0001,
trial number, F(3, 45) = 71.42, p = 0, and object possibility, F(1, 15) = 22.49, p =
.001. The interaction between experiment and trial number was significant F(3,
45) = 9.24, p = .0001, but no other interactions approached significance.
Separate ANOVAs were also undertaken for each experiment. For Experi-
ment 2, the main effect of trial number was significant, F(3, 45) = 45.4, p = 0, as
was the main effect of object possibility, F(1, 15) = 18.36, p = .0001. The inter-
action between these two factors was not significant, F(3, 45) = 1.23, p = .31.
Analysis of simple effects confirmed that object possibility had a significant
effect on every trial, F(1, 15) = 6.82, 8.33, 6.89, and 16.57, for trials 1 to 4,
respectively, p < .025 in all cases. A similar pattern of significant effects was
confirmed for Experiment 3. The main effect of trial number, F(3, 45) = 72.64,
p = 0, and the main effect of object possibility, F(1, 15) = 10.16, p < .01, were
both significant. The interaction between these effects was not significant,
F(3,45) = 1.44, p = .24. Analysis of simple effects revealed that object possibil-
ity had a significant effect on each of trials 1 to 3, but not on trial 4: F(1, 15) =
8.59, p = .01; F(1, 15) = 19.29, p = .001; F(1, 15) = 5.6, p = .032; and, F(1, 15) =
0.68, p = .42, respectively.
Finally, a 2 (Experiment) × 2 (Object Possibility) ANOVA was undertaken
for the first trial of both experiments. The main effect of experiment was signif-
icant, F(1, 15) = 4.46, p = .05, as was the main effect of object possibility, F(1,
15) = 16.57, p = .001. The interaction between these two factors was not signifi-
cant, F(1, 15) < 1. Simple effects analysis confirmed that object possibility had
a significant impact on performance in both Experiment 2 and Experiment 3,
F(1, 15) = 6.82 and 8.59, respectively, p < .025 in each case.
Discussion
Two months after their involvement in Experiment 2, participants showed
some retention of the shape–name associations they had learned, and the effect
of object possibility was still in evidence. Participants had not anticipated
having their memory tested again. Therefore, the results encourage the view
that the learning in Experiment 2 reflected processes normally associated with
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the long-term learning of object names, rather than with special purpose pro-
cesses established temporarily for the specific task at hand.
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 4 replicated Experiment 2 except for the manner in which memory
for the shape–name associations was tested. Instead of presenting a picture and
asking participants to recall the associated name, the picture–name association
was tested in the reverse direction. The experimenter presented each name (by
saying, for example, “Which is the dax?”) and asked participants to pick out the
associated picture from the total set of 24 displayed on the table in front of them.
As in Experiment 2, a different random order of testing the name–picture asso-
ciations was used on each of the four trials.
Method
Participants. Twenty undergraduate students at Lancaster University par-
ticipated in the experiment. None had participated in the preceding experi-
ments.
Materials, design, and procedure. These were the same as for Experiment
2, with participants again completing four trials, each comprising a study and
test phase. The one procedural difference related to the way in which memory
for the shape–name associations was tested. At the beginning of each test
phase, the experimenter displayed all 24 cards on the table in front of the partic-
ipant in a random arrangement. She then presented each non-word within the
context of a sentence frame that asked participants to point out the associated
picture (e.g., “Which is the dax?”).
Results
Table 5 presents the mean number of objects correctly identified by a partici-
pant as a function of object type and trial number.
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TABLE 5
Experiment 4: Mean number of objects correctly
identified by a participant as a function of object
type and trial number (max. score = 12)
Trial Number
———————————————
Object Type 1 2 3 4
Possible 2.75 4.45 6.40 8.00
Impossible 2.20 4.10 5.60 7.30
Performance improved across successive trials, as one would expect. In
addition, on all four trials pictures of possible objects were more often correctly
identified than were pictures of impossible objects. A 4 (Trial Number) × 2
(Object Possibility) ANOVA confirmed the significance of trial number, F(3,
57) = 82.03, p < .001, and object possibility, F(1, 19) = 6.87, p < .02. The inter-
action between these two factors was not significant, F(3, 57) < 1. Tests of
simple effects showed that object possibility failed to have a significant effect
on trials 1 and 2, F(1, 19) = 1.24, p = .28, and F(1, 19) = 0.54, p = .47, respec-
tively. However, on trials 3 and 4 the effect of object possibility was significant,
F(1, 19) = 4.75, p < .05, and F(1, 19) = 6.60, p < .02, respectively. In contrast
with Experiment 2, a significant effect of object possibility was not observed on
all four trials, and the less robust nature of the effect meant that it did not emerge
as a significant factor in an item-based analysis. It is not clear why this should
be so, though the procedure might be seen to hold potential for more inter-
ference during memory retrieval (participants needed to scan the set of 24 pic-
tures after being given a name, even if they could recall the corresponding
picture without looking for it, and this may be more prone to interference than
retrieving a name in response to the presentation of a single picture).
Discussion
A possible objects coherent, 3D structure makes it easier to learn its name, even
when this is tested in the reverse direction, i.e., when people select a pictured
object in response to hearing a name. Of course, adopting a procedure that
probes the association in the reverse direction does not guarantee that the
underlying representations were also accessed in the reverse direction. It is con-
ceivable, for example, that after hearing a name probe, participants looked at
each picture in turn, retrieved its name, and then compared this against the
name probe offered by the experimenter. Although further work is needed to
reveal the way underlying processes differ according to task instructions, the
present results do suggest that the privileged link between global, 3D shape and
object name will impact on behaviour in a variety of situations.
EXPERIMENT 5
Previous studies have been interpreted as demonstrating that object decision
and recognition can draw on separate visual representations (see Cooper &
Schacter, 1992). The dependence of object decision performance exclusively
on structural descriptions of the global, 3D shapes of objects is understandable
given the nature of the information on which the decisions have to be made.
Confirmation of this comes from the observation that priming is confined to
possible objects and to situations in which the encoding task requires attention
to be focused on the global shapes of the objects (Schacter et al., 1990). More
614 WALKER, DIXON, SMITH
generally, however, the stochastic independence of object decision and recog-
nition for previously studied possible objects is indicative of the absence of
shared processes (Schacter et al., 1990, 1991a). Finally, object decisions have
proven insensitive to a range of manipulations that influence recognition
memory (Cooper et al., 1992b; Schacter & Cooper, 1993; Schacter et al.,
1991a).
The idea that recognition can utilize representations other than those sup-
porting object decision also receives some support (Cooper & Schacter, 1992).
Apart from the stochastic independence of the two types of decision, there have
been occasions when object possibility has had little or no impact on recogni-
tion memory, despite having a big impact on object decision (see, for example,
Cooper et al., 1992b, Exp. 1; Schacter et al., 1991a). In addition, particular
changes in the encoding instructions have been seen to eliminate priming in the
object decision task, while at the same time enhancing recognition memory for
the same objects (Schacter et al., 1990).
Given the nature of the information on which object decisions have to be
made, the claim that they rely exclusively on structural descriptions of global,
3D shape would seem a reasonable one. However, the idea that recognition
memory relies exclusively on other representations, and not at all on the repre-
sentations underpinning object decisions, is not so easy to explain. One expla-
nation might start with the premise that structural descriptions can contribute to
implicit remembering (e.g., priming) but not to explicit remembering (e.g., rec-
ognition) (Cooper & Schacter, 1992; Schacter et al. 1990). Support for this
premise has been drawn from the fact that amnesic patients show normal levels
of priming in the object decision task (Schacter, Cooper, Tharan, & Rubens,
1991b). However, appealing to the general distinction between implicit and
explicit remembering introduces its own uncertainties. For example, it is
unclear why, in principle, a structural description system could not contribute
to explicit remembering. Indeed, although there have been occasions when
object possibility has had little or no effect on recognition memory, despite
having a big impact on object decision, (see, for example, Cooper, Schacter,
Ballesteros, & Moore, 1992, Exp. 1; Schacter et al., 1991a), there have been
other occasions when it has had a consistent and significant effect on recogni-
tion memory (see, for example, Schacter & Cooper, 1993). Furthermore, in
Experiments 2 and 3 of the present study, an effect of object possibility was
observed in a test of explicit remembering, albeit a test that focused on memory
for object–name associations rather than on memory for the objects them-
selves. Indeed, Cooper, Schacter, Ballesteros, and Moore (1992, p. 54)
acknowledge that object possibility can influence explicit recognition memory.
They propose that any source of information that can distinguish to-be-remem-
bered items, including structural descriptions recoverable from possible
objects, can support episodic retrieval processes, provided these sources of
information were part of the conditions under which the items were originally
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encoded. The final experiment to be reported explores this issue in relation to
shape–name associations.
Experiment 1 failed to reveal an effect of object possibility on recognition
memory, whether or not participants were forewarned that their memory would
be tested. However, in previous studies, object-decision priming and the
accompanying effects of object possibility have been observed only when the
encoding instructions have directed participants’ attention to the global shape
of each object (e.g., Schacter et al., 1990). Thus, priming of possible objects has
been observed when participants have indicated whether each priming object
faced left or right, but not when they have said if it contained more vertical or
horizontal edges. It would appear, therefore, that deriving a structural descrip-
tion of an objects overall shape is not obligatory, and is partly determined by the
encoding instructions. In turn, therefore, object possibility might influence rec-
ognition only when the encoding instructions ensure the salience of the global
shape of each object.
Evidence was reviewed in the Introduction suggesting that representations
of the global, 3D shapes of objects have privileged links with their names. So
that, for example, naming objects at presentation draws peoples attention to
object shape, with the result that the objects are categorised according to their
shape and their names are extended to new objects on this basis (Landau, 1994).
Experiment 5 examines incidental and intentional memory for pictures of
objects in the manner of Experiment 1, but incorporates a condition in which
the objects are named by the experimenter as they are presented in the study
phase. In this way the experiment tests two ideas. First, hearing a pictured
object named at presentation will increase the likelihood that a representation
of its global, 3D shape is derived. Second, such a representation will support
recognition memory for the picture. Therefore, in the condition where objects
are named at presentation, it is predicted that recognition memory will be supe-
rior for pictures of possible objects compared with pictures of impossible
objects. By contrast, in the condition where objects are not named at presenta-
tion, it is predicted that recognition memory will be equivalent for possible and
impossible objects, as was observed in Experiment 1.
Method
Participants. Eighty undergraduate students at Lancaster University par-
ticipated in the experiment. None had participated in any of the previous exper-
iments. Twenty students were randomly assigned to each of the four conditions
obtained by crossing two factors—Naming (no-naming versus naming) and
Memory Condition (incidental versus intentional remembering)—with the
constraint that the same number of male (and female) participants took part in
each condition.
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Materials. Pictures of 10 possible and 10 impossible objects were selected
at random from the pool of pictures used in Experiment 1. Similarly, 20 of the
single-syllable non-words generated for Experiment 2 were selected at random
for use here.
Design. A mixed design was employed, with Naming and Memory Con-
dition as between-participants factors, and Object Possibility as a within-
participants factor. For each trial, five possible and five impossible objects
were selected at random from the set of 20 pictures. For the naming condition,
10 of the non-words were randomly selected from the pool of 20 and randomly
assigned for each participant to the 10 to-be-remembered pictures.
Procedure. The procedure was essentially the same as for Experiment 1,
with arithmetic again providing a cover story in the incidental memory condi-
tion to hide the fact that recognition memory for the pictures was to be tested.
For the no-naming condition the same procedure was used as for Experiment 1.
The only difference for the naming condition was that the experimenter named
each picture as it was presented during the study phase. The non-words were
embedded in a sentence frame that gave them the role of a count noun (e.g.,
“This is a dax.”).
After presentation of the sequence of to-be-remembered pictures, all 20 pic-
tures selected for that trial were displayed on a table in front of the participant.
In the naming condition no mention was made of the names that had been asso-
ciated with the objects during the study phase. Rather, participants were
requested simply to identify the pictures they had seen earlier.
Participants completed just one trial and in the incidental memory condition
they were asked if they had anticipated the memory test. In the event, this was
not anticipated by any of the participants.
Results
Table 6 presents the mean number of possible and impossible objects correctly
recognized by a participant as a function of the naming and memory conditions.
For the no-naming condition, the results replicate those obtained in Experiment
1. Although recall is generally enhanced by an intention to remember, it is not
influenced by object possibility. For the naming condition, the pattern of results
is different. Although there is again a general increase in recall with an inten-
tion to remember, there is now an effect of object possibility, with structurally
possible objects being better recalled than impossible objects. A 2 (Naming
Condition) × 2 (Memory Condition) × 2 (Object Possibility) ANOVA revealed
significant main effects of memory condition, F(1, 76) = 14.01, p < .001, and
object possibility, F(1, 76) = 12.27, p < .001. Although the main effect of
naming was not significant, F(1, 76) < 1, its interaction with object possibility
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was significant, F(1, 76) = 9.39, p < .01. Analysis of simple effects confirmed
that object possibility influenced memory in the naming condition, F(1, 76) =
21.56, p < .001, but not in the no-naming condition, F(1, 76) < 1.
An item-based analysis was undertaken on the number of participants cor-
rectly remembering each of the 20 items. After collapsing the data across the
incidental and intentional memory conditions, an ANOVA was completed with
object possibility as a between-items factor and naming as a within-items fac-
tor. Although the main effectsof naming and object possibility were not signifi-
cant, F(1, 18) < 1, and F(1, 18) = 1.34, p = .26, the interaction between these
factors was marginally significant, F(1, 18) = 4.06, p = .06. Analysis of simple
effects confirmed that, whereas object possibility had no effect on memory in
the no-naming condition, F(1, 18) < 1, it had a significant effect in the naming
condition, F(1, 18) = 5.82, p < .03.
Finally, except for the fact that a fixed sub-set of 20 pictures was used in
Experiment 5, the no-naming condition provides a replication of Experiment 1.
When the results from this condition were combined with those from Experi-
ment 1, the overall mean number of possible and impossible objects correctly
recognized on an individual trial was 3.59 and 3.61, respectively (out of 5 in
each case). With memory condition (incidental versus intentional) as a
between-participants factor and object possibility as a within-participants fac-
tor, ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of memory condition, with
better recall in the intentional condition than in the incidental condition (3.84
versus 3.37, respectively). The main effect of object possibility and its interac-
tion with memory condition were both very small and insignificant, F(1, 118) =
0.18 and .07, respectively. With the results of 120 participants contributing to
this analysis, there is protection against a Type II error in relation to these null
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TABLE 6
Experiment 5: Mean number of possible and impossible
objects correctly recognized by a participant as a function
of whether or not objects were named at study, and
whether remembering was incidental or intentional
Object Type
—————————







Maximum score = 5, chance = 2.5.
results (see the discussion of effect size, power, and sample size in the context
of Experiment 1).
Discussion
Object possibility enhanced recognition memory, but only when objects were
named at presentation. Hearing an object named at presentation appears to have
increased the likelihood that a description of its global, 3D shape was derived.
This description then supported recognition memory, so that naming enhanced
memory for possible objects only. This finding reinforces the idea that names
have privileged links with descriptions of global, 3D shape, and contradicts the
view that recognition memory cannot be supported by such descriptions (see
Cooper & Schacter 1992, for a review). Therefore, as Cooper et al. (1992b, p.
54) propose, recognition memory, like object decision, can be supported by
descriptions of global, 3D shape when the original encoding task encourages
the derivation of these descriptions (see also, Schacter et al., 1990).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study has compared peoples memory for pictures of possible and
impossible objects and provided evidence that object names are closely linked
with representations of global, 3D shape. When people learned single-syllable
non-words as names (count nouns) for pictures of objects, they did so more eas-
ily for structurally possible objects than for structurally impossible objects
(Experiments 2–4). This effect was independent of the memorability and dis-
tinctiveness of the individual items. Given that the non-words were randomly
assigned to the pictures, the differential ease with which names were learned to
possible and impossible objects appears to reflect the differential memorability
of different types of object–name association. More specifically, the results
indicate that object names have close links with the descriptions of global, 3D
shape that are recoverable from structurally possible objects but not from struc-
turally impossible objects.
Whereas in Experiments 2 and 3 participants memory for picture–name
associations was tested by presenting a picture and asking for the correspond-
ing name, in Experiment 4 it was tested by presenting a name and asking for the
corresponding picture to be selected from the pool. In each case, name learning
was easier for pictures of possible objects, suggesting some generality to the
processes being revealed.
Experiment 3 showed that the associations learned in Experiment 2 were
retained, albeit imperfectly, for 2 months, even though participants had no
expectation that their memory for the associations would be tested again. Had
the learning been confined to the period of Experiment 2, it might have been
seen to reflect special purpose mechanisms, specifically and temporarily
OBJECT SHAPE–NAME LINKS 619
established for the experimental task. Instead, however, it seems that memory
for the associations reflected processes supporting the long-term learning of
object names. The impact of object possibility implies, therefore, that descrip-
tions of global, 3–D shape normally contribute to such long-term learning in the
real world.
Experiments 1 and 5 indicated that the derivation of a description of the
global, 3D shape of an object is not obligatory. When the encoding task does
not draw peoples attention to this aspect of an object, object possibility need not
have an effect on recognition memory, even when remembering is intentional.
However, when another person is heard to name the object at presentation, then
object possibility has an effect on recognition memory, indicating two things.
First, hearing the name of an object increases the probability that a description
of its global shape will be derived. Second, explicit recognition memory for the
object can benefit from the availability of such a description.
The results of Experiments 1 and 5 are consistent with previous work com-
paring memory for possible and impossible objects. Thus, priming in the object
decision task, seen as reflecting the derivation of a structural description, has
been observed only when the encoding task has drawn attention to the objects
global shape (Schacter et al., 1990). A strong prediction from the present study
is that hearing objects named at presentation will provide an encoding context
that gives rise to priming in the object decision task. In addition, object possibil-
ity has occasionally been observed to influence recognition. This has occurred
in situations where the encoding task has drawn attention to the global shape of
the objects and where, as a consequence, priming of object decisions has been
observed (Cooper et al., 1992b; Schacter & Cooper, 1993; Schacter et al., 1990;
Schacter et al., 1991a). The results of Experiments 1 and 5 also indicate that a
description of an objects global shape will influence recognition memory when
attention is drawn to that aspect of the object during the study phase. Hearing
someone else name an object appears to serve this purpose.
Boucart and Humphreys (1992) and Boucart, Humphreys, and Lorenceau
(1995) have provided evidence for a close association between attending to the
global form of a pictured object and object identification. They demonstrate
that object identification occurs automatically whenever visual attention is
directed at the global form of an object. This happens, for example, when par-
ticipants judge whether two successively presented pictures depict objects hav-
ing the same global shape or the same general orientation in the picture plane.
Object identification does not occur automatically when participants attend to
local features of the pictures, as when they judge whether two pictures have
been drawn with the same colour of line. Boucart et al. (Boucart & Humphreys,
1992; Boucart et al., 1995) conclude that attending to the global form of a stim-
ulus is a sufficient condition for activating the stored object representations
mediating object identification. Extending these ideas to the present study, we
would suggest that hearing someone name an object will encourage attention to
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be directed globally, at the overall configuration of a figure (i.e., with attention
zoomed-out to just the right degree), because this allows the types of represen-
tation most supportive of object categorization to be encoded. We predict,
therefore, that object naming will cause attention to be broadly spread in order
to simultaneously embrace the external contours (envelope) of a pictured
object.
There is other evidence indicating that the derivation of object-based
descriptions of 3D shape is not obligatory, but requires the encoding task to
direct attention appropriately. In a study examining the role of attention in per-
ceptual constancy, Epstein and Lovitts (1985) have shown that for a post-con-
stancy representation of an objects shape to be derived, it is not sufficient for a
person to look at the object, even if this involves close inspection (as is needed,
for example, to count the number of small marks along its principal axis). How-
ever, a post-constancy description of shape is derived when people are told that
their recognition memory for each object will be tested and that study-test
changes in the objects orientation in depth will need to be taken into account. In
other words, a post-constancy description of shape is derived when it is
explained that the representation on which the recognition decision is to be
made is a viewpoint-independent representation of object shape. A prediction
from the present study would be that naming a shape will increase the likeli-
hood that a post-constancy description is derived. One final point worth making
in the context of this work is that Epstein and Lovitts employed recognition
memory as the dependent variable, and so their results provide further evidence
that viewpoint-independent descriptions of object shape can contribute to
explicit recognition memory. These results make it difficult to defend either the
claim that implicit and explicit memory draw on separate representations, or
the claim that explicit recognition memory for objects cannot draw on the types
of description of object shape that mediate priming in the object decision task.
Instead, it seems that whereas object decision relies exclusively on a represen-
tation of an objects global, 3D structure, recognition memory can utilize these
and other representations. The other representations appear to be equivalent for
possible and impossible objects, and so must involve more localized object fea-
tures. Judging from previous work they also seem to preserve information
about parity and size, and are assumed to preserve objects surface features, such
as colour (Biederman & Cooper, 1992; Cooper, 1994; Cooper & Schacter,
1992; Cooper et al., 1992b).
Barbara Landau and her colleagues (see Landau, 1994; Landau et al., 1998)
have shown that labelling an object with a count noun draws attention to its
shape, with the effect that names are extended to novel objects on the basis of
their shape. This has proved to be quite a specific effect, since it can be replaced
by a bias towards extending names on the basis of material and surface proper-
ties if a standard object is labelled with a non-word in the guise of an adjective
(e.g., “This is a daxy one”, “Which of these is a daxy one?”). Of course, in order
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to create a bias to respond according to the material and surface properties of an
object, it is important that these properties are clearly discriminable. If they are
not, then there is little alternative to shape as a basis for categorization and name
extension.
It would have been valuable to further explore the links between object rep-
resentations and verbal labels by examining the interaction between object pos-
sibility and type of verbal label assigned to a picture (count noun versus
adjective). The effects of object possibility would have been expected to be
much less evident, if evident at all, for the adjective labels. Unfortunately,
although simple line drawings can depict object shape very effectively via
edge-based features, and are an ideal medium for depicting impossible objects,
they are much less appropriate for depicting material and surface properties.
Therefore, in order to examine the interaction between object possibility and
type of verbal label, it will be necessary to present objects in a different way, but
in a way that is still capable of depicting impossible, as well as possible, objects.
Two other lines of research also encourage the view that there is a close link
between representations concerned exclusively with object shape and repre-
sentations of object name. One line of research has investigated the visual
representations utilized by people when they combine visual images of two
recently presented pictures in order to identify an emergent form
(Brandimonte, Hitch, & Bishop, 1992; Hitch, Brandimonte, & Walker, 1995;
Walker, Hitch, Dewhurst, Whiteley, & Brandimonte, 1997). Two types of
visual representation have been shown to support image combination. The first
is a relatively literal representation preserving information about the surface
properties of an object (e.g., colour and texture) as well as its shape. The second
is a more abstract representation concerned solely with object shape. Of partic-
ular relevance in the context of the present study is the observation that naming
the to-be-combined objects at presentation causes people to rely on the second
type of representation to discover the emergent form (Brandimonte et al., 1992;
Hitch et al., 1995; Walker et al., 1997).
The second line of investigation is concerned with the manner in which
young children depict objects in their drawings. It has been observed that nam-
ing a familiar object increases the likelihood that children, when drawing the
object, will depict parts that are currently out of view (Bremner & Moore, 1984;
Lewis, Russell, & Berridge, 1993) Indeed, Bremner and Moore found that
naming the object had the same effect on childrens drawings as allowing them
prior inspection of the object from a variety of angles, something that would be
expected to support the derivation of a global, viewpoint independent descrip-
tion of the object. Bremner and Moore, and Lewis et al. propose that naming
had this effect because viewpoint-independent categorical representations of
objects are tagged with their category names. More recently, Walker, Cooper,
and Bremner (submitted) have demonstrated that when 5- and 6-year-old chil-
dren hear the experimenter name a novel object with a novel name (“This is a
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dax”) their drawings of the object are more likely to include a hidden part.
Walker et al. argue that this happens because names are directly linked to view-
point-independent representations of the particular object being drawn, and
these representations incorporate information about all the important parts of
an object, including any that are currently out of view.
Other researchers have presented strong arguments for the idea that repre-
sentation of an objects shape is linked to representation of its name only indi-
rectly, via representation of its semantic features (for reviews, see Bruce &
Humphreys, 1994, and Humphreys, Lamote, & Lloyd-Jones, 1995). For exam-
ple, the Interactive Activation and Competition (IAC) approach to object pro-
cessing (Humphreys et al., 1995) assumes a hierarchical organization across
these different domains of representation (pools of representational units), with
structural units being activated before semantic units, which in turn are acti-
vated before name units. Hence, it is argued that semantic knowledge needs to
be   activated   for   object   naming   to   be   possible,   and   evidence   from
neuropsychology is recruited to support this argument. However, despite its
hierarchical organization, the IAC model assumes a direct mapping of sorts
between structural units and name units, because semantic units are relatively
directly linked to structural units to reflect the fact that for many object catego-
ries category members are structurally similar to each other. Thus, in the
graphic illustration of the IAC model, Humphreys et al. show individual struc-
tural units mapping on to individual semantic units, which in turn map on to
individual name units.
The objects depicted in the pictures used in the present study were designed
to be largely devoid of semantic features, and yet people were able to learn the
associations between object shape and object name. One way of reconciling
this with the hierarchical organization of the three representational domains
would be to argue that the particular circumstances of the present study caused
participants to draw on aspects of the visual cognitive system that are not nor-
mally involved in object processing. However, since it is not uncommon for
people to learn object names before they have an appreciation of the functional
and associative significance of the objects, the circumstances of the present
study may not be especially unusual. A second way of reconciling the semanti-
cally impoverished nature of the objects used here with models of object pro-
cessing would be to assume that information flows through successive
representational domains in cascade, rather than in a discrete fashion where
processing in one domain does not begin until processing in preceding domains
is complete. Having made this assumption in relation to their IAC model,
Humphreys et al. indicate that it is not necessary for all semantic knowledge to
be retrieved in order for naming to take place. So that, for example, for an object
sharing very few structural features with other members of its category, there
may be very little semantic activation prior to naming, giving the impression
that object naming is being directly driven by object structure. On this basis, the
OBJECT SHAPE–NAME LINKS 623
novel objects used in the present study qualify as candidates for relatively direct
naming since, by definition, they are structurally dissimilar from any objects in
existing categories. Thus, to propose that structural descriptions and name
codes can be reciprocally and closely linked may not be incompatible with hier-
archical models of object processing, like IAC, in which semantic representa-
tions are able to intervene.
NOTES
(1) Enns (1992) discusses the visual processes that recover the global, 3D structure of objects
from line drawings. Refering to Enns and Rensink’s PRISM model (1991), he argues that early
visual processes derive local estimates for the segmentation of object parts (from T-junctions) and
for the 3D orientations of surfaces that meet at convex and concave corners (from arrow- and Y-
junctions). He proposes that these estimates can be derived quickly and in parallel across the
visual field provided there is a relaxation of the strict requirements for validity that models of early
visual processing conventionally demand. For example, the crossbar of a T-junction might always
be interpreted initially as a boundary edge, even though it could arise from the accidental
alignment of a surface with the line of sight. To deal with the occasional errors of interpretation
arising from relaxing the demand for validity, later visual processes are thought to complete a
consistency check across all regions to determine if, for example, surfaces are being assigned the
same orientation on the basis of different local features. Some of the evidence reviewed by Enns to
support his proposals comes from peoples responses to line drawings of objects that yield either
consistent or inconsistent sets of local 3D interpretations, like the pictures of structurally possible
and impossible objects employed in the present study. Of particular significance in the present
context, Enns approach assumes there are processes sensitive to the consistency (possibility) of
the 3D interpretations being recovered from different parts of an object. On this basis, therefore,
investigating the effects of object possibility should benefit our understanding of basic visual
processes supporting object perception. The benefits should extend beyond the specifics of the
object decision task.
(2) Ratcliff and McKoon (1995), and Williams and Tarr (1997) have recently questioned the
idea that priming in the object decision task reflects the influence of representations of global, 3D
shape that are recoverable for possible objects only. Most notably, Ratcliff and McKoon (1995)
propose that the typical pattern of results from the object decision task arises from the combined
effects of two influences. First, from a tendency for previously seen objects (whether possible or
impossible) to be judged “possible” . And second, from a tendency to remember explicitly how a
previously seen object was classified at the time (as possible or impossible) and then to re-adopt
this classification as the judgement in the object decision task. Whereas for possible objects both
influences encourage a “possible” response, for impossible objects they work in opposition.
Ratcliff and McKoon explain the apparent absence of priming for impossible objects by arguing
that these two opposing influences just cancel each other out. Although the present study accepts
the main assumption underlying the original interpretation of the priming effect in the object
decision task (i.e., that a representation of an objects global, 3D shape is recoverable for possible
objects only), it is not dependent on the correct interpretation of this effect, which might well be
task specific. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth pointing out that the evidence Ratcliff and McKoon
provide for their argument is not without its problems. For example, concerns exist regarding the
appropriateness of the pictures used in their experiments (see Williams & Tarr, 1997), and about
what their participants explicitly remembered about the pictures from the study phase of the object
decision task. When Ratcliff and McKoon asked a group of people to judge whether each of their
pictures depicted a possible or an impossible object, and gave them unrestricted viewing in order
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to arrive at a decision, their performance was unimpressive. Only 78% agreed that the possible
objects were possible, and only 76% agreed that the impossible objects were impossible. One can
only wonder how many participants in the first phase of Ratcliff and McKoon’s experiments
spontaneously became aware of the possible/impossible status of each picture when they were
concentrating on judging the overall orientation of each object and had not been informed about
structural possibility as an aspect of the drawings. Uncertainty about the status of each picture is
heightened by the very low levels of performance observed in the object decision task itself. For
example, the participants in Ratcliff and McKoon’s sixth experiment seemed unable to decide that
the impossible pictures were impossible, their responses being fairly evenly split across the
“possible” and “impossible” categories. With these reservations, it is not clear just what Ratcliff
and McKoon’s participants were explicitly remembering about the pictures from the study phase.
Not only is it unclear how they interpreted each picture at study, it is also unclear if these
interpretations were then remembered. Despite the important role that explicit memory for the
study pictures plays in their proposals, Ratcliff and McKoon relied on indirect and unconfirmed
attempts to manipulate explicit remembering. And indeed, as a counter to Ratcliff and McKoon’s
proposals, Schacter and Cooper (1995) make much of the fact that in their own experiments
explicit memory for the study pictures varied significantly across conditions, yet the pattern of
priming effects in the object decision task remained unchanged.
Williams and Tarr (1997) endeavoured to clarify and extend the concept of bias in the object
decision task. They offer a different explanation for the priming that occurs, but in doing so they
too deny any role for a unitary representation of a possible objects global, 3D shape. Instead, they
propose that people performing the object decision task analyse the different portions of an object
separately from each other. Priming in the task is then seen to reflect facilitated encoding of
structurally possible portions when they are re-encountered by the participant. By arguing that
priming is confined to possible portions (because it is based on the recovery of coherent 3D
descriptions) their approach is similar to the original explanation of why priming in the object
decision is restricted to possible objects (see Cooper & Schacter, 1992). The fundamental
difference between the two approaches revolves around the issue of whether a whole object can
sometimes be treated as a portion in the Williams and Tarr sense. Various factors might determine
the scale at which structural portions are segregated, and the complexity of an object might be one
of these. For objects that are complex (perhaps because they comprise a larger number of
constituent geons) it might be difficult to sustain analysis at a global level. This also might be the
case when participants have to distinguish between possible and impossible objects that have the
same global configuration and differ only in the structural possibility of an individual portion/
geon (see Williams & Tarr, 1997). We would contend that the possible objects devised for the
present study were simple enough for processing to be initiated and sustained at a global level. If
so, then, as Enns (1992) points out, a discrepant 3D feature in a line drawing of an object can be
interpreted as discrepant only in the context of the interpretations of other, neighbouring 3D
features. For a relatively simple object this would mean that the whole object is likely to qualify as
a portion in the Williams and Tarr sense. Further work is needed to clarify the factors determining
the different levels at which objects are attended and represented, and the scale at which
possibility/impossibility is interpreted. At this stage, however, we believe that interpretations of
structural possibility can emerge in relation to representations of the 3D shape of whole objects.
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